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ABSTRACT 
This thesis contains readings of a number of Victorian poems by Alfred 
Tennyson, Robert Browning and Dante Gabriel Rossetti which dramatise 
paranoia and jealousy. A range of twentieth-century theories of paranoia 
(including clinical, Freudian and Lacanian) have been used as explanatory tools 
for interpreting the representations of paranoia in the poems. The reading of 
Tennyson's Maud is based on Freud ' s theory of homoerotic motives. The 
reading of Browning' s " ' Childe Roland to the Dark Tower Came'" is based on 
the Lacanian concepts of foreclosure and the Name-of-the-Father. The readings 
of the jealousy poems are based on both theories, and this section includes a 
discussion of the limitations of the theories as explanatory tools. The general 
approach has been to apply clinical and psychoanalytical constructs and 
explanations to each poem separately, although there is some discussion 
involving the comparison of paranoid behaviours and motives across all the 
poems. Areas for further research are suggested in the concluding chapter. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION: THEORIES OF PARANOIA AND LITERARY ANALYSIS 
This thesis will apply different models of paranoia to several Victorian poems that 
dramatise paranoia, with the aim of providing new readings of these poems. This 
chapter contains an overview of the various models of paranoia used in the thesis as 
well as a discussion of the relevance of these models to literary criticism, and in 
particular to Victorian poetry. The following two chapters each contain a reading of a 
well-known Victorian monologue in the light of the various models of paranoia. The 
penultimate chapter focuses on a particular manifestation of paranoia, jealousy, and 
contains an examination of five poems that dramatise jealousy. Throughout, the 
emphasis is on exploring the ways in which paranoia theory adds to a reading of the 
poems, although its limitations are also noted. The final chapter continues this 
discussion and indicates some areas for further research. 
The two major models of paranoia which will be applied in this thesis are the 
clinical and the psychoanalytic. The clinical picture of paranoia, which has taken 
shape throughout the twentieth century, began in 1919 when Emil Kraepelin 
formulated a description of paranoia that remains basically unchanged today. 
Kraepelin limited paranoia to disorders with systematized delusional systems, that is, 
delusions that are structured, coherent, interconnected and elaborate (299). He also 
emphasised the thoughtful construction of the delusions (for instance, the 
rationalisation of contradictions) and the tenacity with which they are held. A number 
of features have since been added to the clinical picture. Max Hutt and Robert Gibby 
(1957) describe ten characteristics of the paranoid individual: a long history of 
instability, a history of undue suspicion, the inability to accept authority figures, a 
tendency to meditate about imagined slights, a rigid personality structure, inflexibility, 
pulls away from groups, misinterprets things that happen to him, perceives threats and 
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attacks in others' behaviour, has ideas of reference (274). Norman Cameron developed 
the notion of a pseudocommunity, an imaginary organisation of real or imagined 
persons who are united in a plot against the patient ( cited in Page 296). James Page 
(I 975) describes paranoid personality traits as unwarranted suspicion, jealousy, envy, 
distrust of others, exaggerated feelings of importance, hypersensitivity to slights, 
independence, self-reliance, isolation, and delusions of grandeur. He also distinguishes 
between paranoid schizophrenia, paranoia and paranoid state (292-296). Steven 
Starker ( 1986) finds the hallmarks of a stable paranoid personality to be 
suspiciousness, externalisation, grandiosity, rigidity, misinterpretation, aloofness, and 
aggressiveness (26-27). Peter Chadwick (1992) proposes that paranoid individuals 
hold onto ideas tenaciously, resist argument, select and distort input to confirm 
paranoid ideation and creatively elaborate delusional constructs (2). He defines 
paranoid mentation as comprising three basic premises: I do deserve it, I am that 
important, and people would go to all that trouble on my account (I 5). Paul 
Chadwick, Max Birchwood and Peter Trower ( 1996) distinguish between two types of 
paranoid patients: ' poor paranoids ' blame others and see themselves as victims, while 
'punishment paranoids' blame themselves and view others as justifiably punishing 
them (138). The most current clinical definition of paranoia is that used in the 
American Psychiatric Association ' s 1987 Diagnostic and Statistical Mamwl of Mental 
Disorders (Third Edition-Revised). 1 The revised edition of this manual changed the 
name of the disorder from Paranoid Disorder to Delusional (Paranoid) Disorder, as 
delusions are the primary symptom. The DSM-111-R further specifies five types of 
delusional disorder determined by the dominant delusional theme: erotomanic, 
grandiose, jealous, persecutory and somatic ( 199). It also distinguishes between 
delusional disorder and paranoid personality disorder which may include "paranoid 
ideation or pathologic jealousy but without delusions" (202). 
One of our first observations must be that the clinical analysis of paranoia is a 
twentieth-century phenomenon and this may lead us to wonder about its relevance to 
the study of Victorian poetry. Certainly the term paranoia was not commonly used in 
1 Henceforth cited as DSM-111-R 
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the period during which the poems in this study were published, 1836-1876. Although 
the Oxford English Dictionary offers examples of usage dated from early in the 1890s, 
William James' The Principles of Psychology (1890) does not use the term. It seems 
likely that the term emerged from and to some extent replaced various other categories 
of mental illness that had been current up to that point, such as delusional insanity, 
moral insanity, melancholia, mania and dementia. It was also about this period that 
dementia praecox (now known as schizophrenia) was afforded status as a discrete 
mental disorder.2 Mental disorders such as paranoia and schizophrenia only came into 
existence as a result of a reconceptualisation of mental disorders from tightly defined 
entities to systemic complexes. For example, in the nineteenth century, melancholia 
and mania were reclassified as parts of a single disorder complex, the manic-
depressive disease complex (now called Bipolar Disorder). The main points I wish to 
make here, though, are that delusion, suspicion, obsession and grandiosity were 
behaviours and attitudes which belonged to the Victorian ages, and indeed all other 
ages, as much as to the twentieth century. However, in the twentieth century, we now 
see something in the confluence of such behaviours that we call paranoia and note that 
this way of conceptualising these behaviours was taking shape in the Victorian period. 
We should, therefore, have no trouble saying that a certain attitude in a Victorian 
poem expresses paranoia, even if this was not a category the Victorians themselves 
would have applied to it - - firstly because we have paranoia only as a result of 
Victorian reconceptualisation of madness, and secondly, because our modern 
conceptualisation of paranoia was being produced in Victorian England, and was 
dramatised in the literature and poetry of that period, even if it had not yet gained the 
quality of a given at the time the poems under study were produced. 
While there are clinical definitions of paranoia and its various subcategories (for 
example, mild paranoia, paranoid personality, paranoid state, paranoid schizophrenia) 
they all exist in relation to a sane/insane opposition. Paranoia and paranoid states are 
all clinically perceived as either abnormal behaviour or abnormal states of mind. Thus, 
2 The main distinctions, then and now, between schizophrenia and paranoia are the degree of personality 
disintegration (higher in schizophrenia) and the coherence of the delusional system (more coherent in 
paranoia). 
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an individual is said to be paranoid when he exhibits behaviours or attitudes which in 
themselves are not necessarily considered pathological, but which are clustered in a 
particular pattern or deemed to be of a pervasive and extreme degree. There is a 
'normal' suspiciousness, and an 'abnormal' suspiciousness; one is indicative of a 
'healthy' individual, the other indicates a mentally disordered individual. Similarly a 
person' s perception of reality may be deemed to be accurate and thus normal, or 
delusional and thus pathological. The basis of the distinctions between normal and 
pathological varies. The DSM-111-R defines a delusion as "a false personal belief 
based on incorrect inference about external reality and firmly sustained in spite of 
what almost everyone else believes and in spite of what constitutes incontrovertible 
and obvious proof or evidence to the contrary" (395). Whether or not an individual is 
diagnosed with a paranoid disorder may depend on his claims being deemed 
objectively true or false/delusional. Page notes that in paranoia "[a]n obvious 
requirement is that the persecutory theme is a delusion with no factual basis or that it 
represents a gross and uncorrectable misinterpretation of some actual event or series of 
events" (293). For instance, an individual may claim that his colleagues hate him, and 
are trying to have him fired . He may have good evidence in support of his suspicions, 
and they may tum out to be correct. This man is called sane. On the other hand, he 
may claim that his colleagues have installed listening devices in his dental work to 
eavesdrop on him. As this claim is unlikely to be objectively true, he may be deemed 
delusional and/or insane. Similarly, in the case of a man who complains people are 
staring at him and whispering about him in the street, his claims may be deemed to be 
objectively false, and thus pathological. However, his claims may be objectively true 
(that is, people are staring at and talking about him), but as it happens, the man is a 
well-known media personality who is understandably the object of public interest. In 
this case the factual basis of his claim is correct, but his interpretation of it ( that it is 
persecutory) is a 'gross misinterpretation of actual events' and thus pathological. 
However, the objective truthfulness of the account is a problematic basis on which to 
define sanity. Take for example the case of a jealous man with delusions that his wife 
is unfaithful. Aside from the objective truth or falseness of his claims, the man's 
behaviour and attitude may nevertheless be pathological (obsessive, interrogatory, 
even violent). Furthermore, Chadwick notes that paranoid individuals often manifest 
behaviours and attitudes which attract the attention of others, instituting a feedback 
loop in which the paranoid individual ' s suspicions that others are staring at him are 
confirmed because others are in fact staring at him, although not for the reason he 
thinks ( 18). 
The usefulness of the clinical model to the study of paranoia is largely diagnostic. 
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It has little to say about the direct causes of paranoia other than to indicate some 
statistically derived data concerning predisposing factors, prevalence and outcome. 
The main analysis of causality in paranoia comes from the second of the two 
investigative models that will be used in this thesis, the psychoanalytic model. 
Sigmund Freud was one of the earliest writers on the causes of paranoia, and has also 
been one of the most influential. Freud' s case study on paranoia was conducted not 
through analysis of a patient per se, but through a close reading of an autobiography, 
Memoirs of a Neurotic (1903, cited in Freud 1911), written by a paranoid individual , 
Judge Daniel Paul Schreber. Freud ' s seminal text is "Psychoanalytic notes upon an 
autobiographical account ofa case of paranoia (dementia paranoides)" (1911/1957, 
Volume III 387-470) but he has written several other articles on paranoia which will 
also be used in this thesis. 3 Freud develops his model of paranoia along the lines of 
his model of hysteria; that is, he proposes that a crisis or intervention has occurred at 
some point in the patient's psychosexual history. This crisis has been repressed, but in 
times of stress the repression and sublimations are undone, resulting in the return of 
the repressed via symptom formation. However, where hysteria relates to a breach 
between the subject's ego and his id, psychosis is the result of a disturbance between 
the ego and the external world, and the delusion is an attempt "to substitute a reality 
more in accord with its desires for the unsatisfactory real one" ( 1924 281). 
The mechanisms by which paranoid symptoms are formed are transference and 
projection. Transference pertains to the detachment of emotional value from an 
3 All citations to Freud refer to the translations of his work in Collected Papers (The Hogarth Press, 
1957), although the date of the original publication is cited in each case to distinguish between the 
various works. 
original source and its transposition onto another figure . Projection pertains to the 
attribution of hostile emotions to external or environmental sources rather than the 
self Freud describes how these mechanisms operate in paranoia: 
The relation between the patient and his persecutor can be reduced to quite a 
simple formula. It appears that the person to whom the delusion ascribes so 
much power and influence, in whose hands all the threads of conspiracy 
converge, is either, if he is definitely named, identical with someone who 
played an equally important part in the patient's emotional life before his 
illness, or else is easily recognizable as a substitute for him. The intensity of 
the emotion is projected outwards in the shape of external power, while its 
quality is changed into the opposite. The person who is now hated and feared 
as a persecutor was at one time loved and honoured. The main purpose of the 
persecution constructed by the patient ' s delusion is to serve as a justification 
for the change in his emotional attitude. (1911 424) 
The original pattern for the persecutor is, of course, Daddy, and the emotions attached 
to this figure are ambivalent : love and hatred. When the Oedipal drama is overlaid on 
the case of paranoia, Freud finds that "the familiar principle forms of paranoia can all 
be represented as contradictions of the single proposition: 'I (a man) love him (a 
man)'" (1911 448). In the paranoid individual this proposition is contradicted by 
delusions of persecution (in which the subject asserts, "I hate him"); erotomania ("she 
loves me"); delusions of jealousy ("she loves him"); and finally, megalomania ("I do 
not love anyone but myself' ). We can observe the similarity of these delusional 
themes to the four sub-types of Delusional Paranoid Disorder in the DSM-111-R, 
namely persecution, erotomanic, jealous, and grandiose. 
Freud has been criticised on several issues. For instance Peter van Sommers has 
pointed out (137) that a delusion of persecution does not actually represent a 
satisfactory emotional outcome for a patient if the whole point of symptom formation 
is to provide a mechanism for dealing with the anxiety resulting from pressing yet 
forbidden wishes. However, as Freud points out, the development of a delusion of 
persecution actually offers powerful ego rewards in the form of self-aggrandizement. 
Furthermore, Freud finds that "[t]he delusion-formation, which we take to be a 
pathological product, is in reality an attempt at recovery, a process of reconstruction 
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... [thus] the man has recaptured a relation, and often a very intense one, to the people 
and things in the world, although the relation may be a hostile one now" (1911 457). 
One of the weaker yet more frequent criticisms that has been made of Freud 
concerns his statement on homosexual wishes. Freud proposes that "the strikingly 
prominent features in the causation of paranoia, especially among males, are social 
humiliations and slights. But if we go into the matter only a little more deeply, we 
shall be able to see that the really operative factor in these social injuries lies in the 
part played in them by the homosexual components of affective life" (1911 445). 
Since Freud, almost without exception, researchers on paranoia have referred to the 
role ofrepressed homosexuality in paranoia, either 'agreeing' with Freud that paranoia 
results from repressed homosexual wishes or 'disagreeing' with Freud and finding that 
the number of paranoid patients who are either professed or latent homosexuals is 
consistent with the occurrence of homosexuality across the population at large. · Either 
way, these researchers miss the point: for Freud homosexuality is a developmental 
phase experienced by all people : "Generally speaking, every human being oscillates 
all through his life between heterosexual and homosexual feelings" (1911 429-30). 
Fixation in this developmental stage, or the undoing of sublimations which entails a 
return to this stage, does not ' make' an individual a homosexual, 'latent' or otherwise; 
rather it results in emotion and ideation associated with this stage of psychosexual 
development. Consider when the homosexual stage occurs: prior to Oedipus and the 
castration complex and the resultant creation of the superego or internalised social 
strictures. The strong sexualized and narcissistic motives of the homosexual phase are 
not done away with as the individual passes through this developmental phase, as 
Freud points out, but are deflected onto other aims, specifically the social instincts. In 
the case of the paranoid, it is exactly the social instincts which are affected, in the loss 
of affect and attachment to the social world which is effected by the withholding of 
love. This loss of attachment clearly signals a return to pre-Oedipal or narcissistic 
ideation. However, given that Freud never actually said that all paranoiacs are 
homosexuals, it is important to remember that for Freud and most of the psychological 
community up to the late twentieth century, homosexuality was essentially 
pathological in nature, constituting an illness to be fixed, and this is a view we may 
certainly feel free to disagree with. 
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While Freud's is no doubt the most influential of the psychoanalytic theories of 
paranoia, Jacque Lacan' s contribution is also important. Lacan's reading of Freud, 
"On a Question Preliminary to any Possible Treatment of Psychosis" (1955/1977, 
Ecrits 179-225), acerbically addresses the misreading of Freud's homosexual thesis 
("Homosexuality, supposedly a determinant of paranoiac psychosis, is really a 
symptom articulated in its process" [190]), and offers his own reading in terms of 
post-Saussurean linguistics.4 In the Lacanian analysis of paranoia, the Oedipus 
complex and the threat of castration describe the processes whereby the subject is 
inducted into the Symbolic Order, the order of the signifier. In Lacan's theory, it is 
the failure of the paternal metaphor ( a function and a law) rather than the failings of a 
specific father which results in psychosis. According to Lacan, the subject is 
constituted in a floating mass of signifiers which assume the shape of an Order insofar 
as certain basic signifiers anchor it. Psychosis is caused by a gap in the chain of 
signifiers, in particular the failure of the paternal metaphor, the Name-of-the-Father. 
Lacan's term for this failure is foreclosure . In a clear reference to the Freudian analogy 
of a patch (in "The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis", 1924) the difference 
between repression and foreclosure has been described with the metaphor of a tissue, 
which is made up of crisscrossing threads in which "repression would figure as a rent 
or tear which none the less could be repaired; while foreclosure would figure in it as a 
gap due to the weaving itself, a primal hole . .. which never would have been anything 
other than the substance of a hole and could only be filled by a patch" (Leclaire, cited 
in Sarup 109). In the Freudian model, the paranoid subject fails to progress from the 
narcissistic stage to the stage of ideal identification. In the Lacanian model 'ideal 
identification' is read as the assumption of the place within the Symbolic Order 
through acquisition of the Name-of-the-Father (a mental representation of a structure), 
a position from which one observes oneself as a man, with all the cultural baggage that 
4 Unless otherwise specified, all citations to Jacques Lacan refer to Ecrits: A Selection , 1977, translated 
by Alan Sheridan. 
entails. Thus Lacan asserts, "the lack of the Name-of-the-Father in that place which, 
by the hole that it opens up in the signified, sets off the cascade ofreshapings of the 
signifier from which the increasing disaster of the imaginary proceeds, to the point at 
which the level is reached at which signifier and signified are stabilized in the 
delusional metaphor" (217). 
The final section of this thesis will examine several poems that dramatise jealousy. 
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There are clinical, behavioural and theoretical reasons for considering jealousy as a 
particular instance of paranoia. In the case of Alfred Tennyson's Maud, examined in 
Chapter Two, jealousy is analysed as one of the distinct delusional themes of the 
speaker. The basis of that analysis is the definition of Delusional (Paranoid) Disorder 
in the DSM-111-R, which differentiates between four sub-types of the disorder, one of 
which is jealousy. One study found that 14% of patients admitted over a three-year 
period with paranoid schizophrenia, paranoia and paranoid illness had jealousy as a 
prominent clinical feature (Gregory White and Paul Mullen 209). White and Mullen 
also observe the correlation between general features of delusion and jealousy, finding 
that delusions (including delusions of jealousy) are held with absolute conviction, are 
experienced as self-evident, are not amenable to reason, are not modified by 
experience, are experienced as of great personal significance, consist of highly 
personal and idiosyncratic convictions, emerge in a non-understandable way, and 
maintain connections between elements that are not comprehensible to others. They 
also observe that the beliefs implicated in the delusion can become the central 
organising factor of the individual ' s existence (188-189). Another reason for 
considering jealousy as an aspect of Paranoid Delusional Disorders is behavioural, 
insofar as jealous behaviour comprises many of the same behaviours as paranoid 
behaviour. These include, for example, suspiciousness, mistrust and hypersensitivity 
to environmental and interpersonal cues. A further reason for linking jealousy to 
paranoia is that Freud did so, in both his article on Judge Schreber ( 1911) and his 
article "Certain Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality" 
(1922/1957, II 232-243). Freud's papers on paranoia and jealousy propose that there 
is a shared aetiology and structure for the two, and, in another linkage between the 
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clinical and the psychoanalytic, this assumption has more or less attained the status of 
a given in modern clinical practice. 
The two strands of research on paranoia (clinical and psychoanalytic) are 
implicated in jealousy research, but a third strand, the sociological/anthropological, 
has also evolved. In the psychological strand, various clinical and anecdotal accounts 
of jealousy exist. An overview of these is provided by White and Mullen. White and 
Mullen's book summarises various research findings on the relationship of jealousy to 
paranoia, delusion, self-esteem, self-image, sexual practices, sexual politics, shame, 
obsessive behaviour, various personality traits, aggression and violence. In the 
psychoanalytic strand, again, Freud's account has been extremely influential. He 
proposed a taxonomy of jealousy comprising three layers: normal, neurotic and 
pathological. Normal jealousy is present to varying degrees in everyone, neurotic 
jealousy is based on guilt and projection, and pathological jealousy is delusional. The 
word delusional returns us to the structure of paranoia Freud elaborated in hi s 1911 
analysis of Judge Schreber; thus his account of pathological jealousy returns to the 
homoerotic proposition. However, as White and Mullen point out (83 ), most recent 
psychoanalytic theory has tended to downplay the role of homosexuality in jealousy 
while retaining the role of intra- and interpersonal conflicts and the role of the ego in 
resolving these - a case of keeping the bath water while throwing out the baby! 
In the third strand of research on jealousy, the sociological/anthropological, 
jealousy has been situated in the context of other cultural practices (such as 
institutional practices of marriage and the regulation of property distribution and 
exchange) and within a network of relationships and their management. These studies 
conclude, to provide one early example from Kingsley Davis (1936), that jealousy is a 
by-product of"the fixed, traditional constellations of rights, obligations and 
neutralities that may be called sexual property" (130) and that jealousy "tends to 
preserve the fundamental institutions of property" (130). A later study by Jessie 
Bernard (1977) argues that jealousy is not an emotion as such but a culturally 
sanctioned and produced behaviour. For example, she finds that if men, in a given 
society, are forgiven for killing to defend their ' honor' , this practice can inhibit 
jealousy-provoking behaviour (by both men and women), but that that inhibitory 
influence will flourish only if jealousy is regarded by the society as a "legitimate 
response". Presumably, although she does not say so, she means when jealousy is a 
legitimate response to certain behaviours seen by that culture as jealousy-provoking. 
As with all structuralist accounts, individual, intrapsychic responses are foreclosed in 
the explanatory formula of cultural cause and effect. 
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Late twentieth-century literary analysis has been an eclectic and multi-disciplinary 
affair, drawing on research and discovery in psychology, philosophy, feminist and 
post-colonial studies. While it appears as though the sociological/anthropological 
approach to jealousy could offer a means of understanding paranoia as it is dramatised 
in literature in a material context or as part of a cultural critique, it does not clearly do 
so, at least in terms of the research available on jealousy (although White and 
Mullen ' s text is an excellent overview). While the sociological/anthropological 
approach is good at contextualising and thus explaining what might be called ' normal ' 
jealousy, it is not very good at explaining individual differences in jealousy, 
particularly at the extreme end of the spectrum, at what is called pathological or 
delusional jealousy. For instance, Davis concludes that " [t]he stimulus to jealousy is 
not so much a physical situation as a meaningful one" (133), and this assertion is 
borne out by the dramatised jealousy analysed in Chapter Four. In these poems certain 
physical situations are perceived as meaningful to the jealous husband or lover in ways 
that differ from the way these situations are perceived by the general population. The 
sociological/anthropological understanding of jealousy cannot account for the aberrant 
individual response, nor does it attempt to do so. 
While, no doubt, jealousy does have something to do with what Bernard calls "the 
channeling and differential emphasis on emotions by the surrounding culture [which] 
specifies when and how they should be experienced" (144), we should not overlook 
the role of individual practices and accounts in shaping that 'surrounding culture' 
itself, and this includes literary accounts. This is the point Michel Foucault makes 
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when he concludes that the eighteenth-century revision of mental disorders "did not 
proceed from observation to the construction of explanatory categories; that on the 
contrary, the images [and] their organising force made possible a structure of 
perception, in which at last the symptoms could attain their significant value and be 
organised as the visible presence of truth" (135). Victorian poetry is one such fulcrum 
point, located temporally between the medico-literary images of humors, blood and 
bile and the twentieth-century medico-literary images of madness as an alternative and 
sometimes privileged mode ofbeing.5 Although the clinical and psychoanalytic 
models of paranoia were some way off temporally, in this period an early model of 
paranoia was being developed : the literary model, in the form of the dramatic 
monologue. Without precluding any of the analyses that follow, it is safe to say that 
the two literary forms which took shape in the Victorian period, the realist novel and 
the dramatic monologue, developed strategies and images for representing human 
subjectivity. As paranoia is a particular mode of subjectivity, in both its clinical form 
and as it is dramatised in literature, it is appropriate to consider what "structures of 
perception" were and are implicated in paranoia as it is represented in Victorian 
poetry. For example, Robert Lougy has suggested that "[m]adness in nineteenth-
century British literature is often isolated within the troubled psychic spaces of the 
affiicted, defined by an outside world whose moral and rational categories are brought 
forward in order to keep the worlds of madness and reason at a distance from each 
other" ( 407). However, the poems in this study, and particularly the poems which 
dramatise jealousy, break down the borders between madness and reason, and the rigid 
separation of the two, and begin the process of articulating madness as an alternative 
perspective which is somehow understandable from and in terms of the normal 
perspective. For example, in Robert Browning's "Porphyria's Lover" the speaker 
says: 
Be sure I looked up at her eyes 
Happy and proud; at last I knew 
Porphyria worshipped me; surprise 
5 See for example, RD. Laing's The Divided Self, 1959; Janet Frame's Faces In the Water, 1961; Ken 
Kesey's One Flew over the Cuckoo's Nest, 1962; and Sylvia Plath's Bell Jar, 1963. 
Made my heart swell, and still it grew 
While I debated what to do. 
That moment she was mine, mine, fair, 
Perfectly pure and good: I found 
A thing to do, and all her hair 
In one long yellow string I wound 
Three times her little throat around, 
And strangled her. (3 1-41) 
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This passage marries cool logic with pathological and murderous jealousy, reason with 
madness, and there is no discrete border between the two. Perhaps, as Lougy suggests, 
madness in this poem is represented as contained within the troubled interior spaces of 
an individual psyche, but this apparent containment does not help Porphyria in the 
end, as madness insists on expression. Thus this poem dramatises madness as faulty 
reasoning, an inch closer along the continuum towards the twentieth-century positive 
valorisation of madness as 'other reasoning' . 
However, paranoia theory, brought to bear on Victorian poetry, does not 
necessarily concern itself with delineating a border between madness and reason; it is 
more concerned with explicating the meaning and meaningfulness of certain situations 
to the person experiencing them. As such, theories of paranoia are also "structures of 
perception" and, although I do not claim that my readings here are the "visible 
presence of truth", I do believe that they make possible new readings of these poems. 
In these readings the theory of paranoia is used as a frame and filter for the poems and 
this requires them to be attended to in specific ways. For instance, some analyses of 
Victorian poetry make biographical links between the sentiments expressed in the 
poem and the life history of the author. Notable among these is Anne Calley ' s 1983 
text, Tennyson and Madness, in which she makes connections between Tennyson' s 
personal and familial experiences of mental illness and specific literary works which 
are thus read as essentially autobiographical. In the use of paranoia theories, authorial 
biographical data is irrelevant, as is historical data concerning reception. Paranoia 
theory itself dictates the areas of emphasis in interpretation, and it does not claim to 
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account for everything in the poem. Other literary critics use different frames and 
filters : Ekbert Faas (1988) makes connections between the rise of psychiatry and 
Victorian poetry, E. Warwick Slinn (1991) relates the poems to post-structural 
conceptions of subjectivity and Harold Bloom ( 197'8) reads Victorian poetry as a 
response to Romantic forms and ideology. With the possible exception of Colley ' s, all 
these approaches have merit insofar as they enrich or 'thicken' the interpretative 
description of the poem. The use of paranoia theories does not preclude these other 
readings, nor is it intended to offer a univocal or restricted truth. It simply offers an 
alternative reading, in much the way an alternative reading of madness, but by no 
means the final one, was produced in Victorian poetry. 
In Chapter Two I put forward a reading of Tennyson's Maud perceived through the 
filter of Freud ' s theory of paranoia. The conflation of these two texts results in an 
emphasis on parts of the poem which are not often analysed: the persona of Maud ' s 
brother, the rival, and the links between Parts One and Three of the poem. In terms of 
uncovering more and different elements of the poem, then, the use of paranoia theory 
is well justified. Nevertheless, paranoia theory does not account for everything in the 
poem. It brings little to a discussion of the beauty of the love lyrics, and has nothing 
to say about the dynamics of gendered power or industrial capitalism; at the same time 
it does not preclude discussion of these matters. It is rather the case that these 
elements are outside the parameters of the Freudian analysis of paranoia except insofar 
as they represent the environmental context of the speaker and are liable to be 
meaningful to him. Paranoia theory elaborates the construction and purpose of the 
paranoid meaning in a literary analysis and is therefore certainly relevant to the 
general critical discussion of Victorian poetry which is much concerned with the 
production of both meaning and selves in Victorian poetry.6 
6 See, for instance, Loy D. Martin, Browning's Dramatic Monologues and the Post-Romantic Subject, 
1985; E. Warwick Slinn, The Discourse of Se/fin Victorian Poetry, 1991; M. Rowlinson, Tennyson's 
Fixations: Psychoanalysis and the topics of the early poetry, 1994; Herbert Sussman, Victorian 
Masculinities: Manhood and Masculine Poetics in Early Victorian Literature and Art, 1995. 
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There are certain difficulties associated with applying diagnostic categories to 
poetry. For instance, a key diagnostic component of paranoia is delusion. One may 
wonder whether it is appropriate to speak of delusions in poetry. The clinical 
definition of a delusion, as I have observed above (2) is "an incorrect inference about 
external reality held in spite of evidence to the contrary" (DSM-111-R 395). How is it 
possible to define or examine ' external reality ' in the case of a dramatic monologue in 
which the only external reality, in terms of the fictional content of the poem, is that 
produced by the speaker? The whole speech is a kind of inference about reality and if 
the speaker's words in one instance are taken to be mistaken the only evidence we 
have for judging them so is that provided by the speaker himself. One way through 
this impasse is not to read the dramatic monologue as a narrative of external reality, 
but to shift the emphasis "from what is perceived to the process of perception, from 
the structure of an external world to the structuring power of individual minds" (Slinn, 
1982 1 ). In this approach there is no need to access historical or biographical data or 
to scan the text for 'proof of anything the speaker says: the text is simply a map of 
subjectivity. This approach finds its fullest expression in the Lacanian conception of 
the paranoid subject, as will be seen in Chapter Three, which offers a reading of 
Robert Browning' s " ' Childe Roland to the Dark Tower Came'" in which the 
perceived is an externalised representation of the perceiving self. 
Apart from these possible objections to applying paranoia theory to Victorian 
poetry, there is one other important question: the validity of the paranoia theory per se . 
As Ekbert Faas has shown, various psychologists and 'alienists', who were much 
inclined to read the poems as case histories, applied clinical understandings of 
madness to these poems at the time of publication. If we have lost faith in the clinical 
paradigms of the Victorian age (ideas such as moral insanity and monomania), on 
what grounds can we assume that modem clinical analyses are any more sound? 
Certainly, a range of objections to Freudian and Lacanian theory have been raised over 
the years. The most significant of these objections is the charge that Freudian and 
Lacanian paranoia theory cannot escape the 'frame' of Oedipal relations. Freud's 
reading of Judge Schreber's autobiography and Lacan's reading of Freud's reading are 
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based on a normative Oedipal structure or, as it is known in Lacanian theory, 
phallocentrism. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guatarri take issue with what they describe 
as the reductiveness of this reading in which "everything is reduced to the father" (89) 
and in which the manifest content of the Judge' s delusion is depoliticised and 
dehistoricised. Although I do not offer a sustained critique of paranoia theories in this 
thesis, the analysis of"Childe Roland" in Chapter Three links paranoia to 
phallocentrism in a way that partially deconstructs Lacanian theory, and the analyses 
of Chapter Four do point out some of the shortcomings in paranoia theory, particularly 
in Freud ' s version of it, as well as suggesting some possible alternatives. Throughout, 
my intention is not to test and give priority to either the psychoanalytic or literary 
portrait of paranoia: they developed at different times, under different conditions and 
for different purposes. Rather, my purpose here is to see what the different models of 
paranoia, when directed back from hindsight onto literary dramatisations from the age 
which gave rise to conceptions of paranoia, enable us to see anew or differently in 
these poems. 
